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One part of Peru’s population failed to benefit from the economic 
boom in 2002-2006, among other reasons because of the deep- rooted 
productive heterogeneity present in the Peruvian economy. In 2006, 
microenterprises and self-employed persons with family workers accounted 
for 53.4 % of total employment, but productivity and average labour 
incomes were very low in that segment. As the corresponding incomes 
grew very slowly between 2002 and 2006, the gain in well-being was 
very slight despite the boom that was being experienced elsewhere in 
the economy. Looking to the future, it will be essential to develop policies 
targeted on microenterprises with competitive potential, to achieve rapid 
productivity growth that raises the well-being of their employees. It will 
also be necessary to recognize that the impacts of economic policy differ 
between microenterprises and larger firms, so that specifically targeted 
measures can be designed to improve microenterprise competitiveness.
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This paper discusses why the economic boom in Peru 
in 2002-2007 was not perceived as such by a large 
proportion of the population. One reason is the Peruvian 
economy’s profound productive heterogeneity, which is 
associated with a very highly segmented labour market. 
This explains why the rapid growth and modernization 
of certain segments of the economy did not spread as 
quickly towards other segments. 
Section II describes the backdrop to the boom 
that started in 2002. Section III considers the uneven 
growth in employment and labour incomes in the 
various segments of the labour market, highlighting 
the importance of microenterprises for understanding 
how the country’s labour market operated. Section 
IV stresses the need to design policies targeting 
microenterprises that have greater competitive potential; 
it then analyses the range of current policies, and 




Between 2002 and 2006, Peru experienced the most 
vigorous economic upswing of its recent history, following 
the 1950-1955 boom fuelled by the Korean War. A rapid 
expansion in the external demand for minerals and other 
extractive products was accompanied by the impact 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA)1 in the United States, which, by lowering 
tariff barriers, stimulated the diversification of non-
traditional exports to that country. Additional factors 
were the promotion of non-traditional exports to many 
other countries of the world and a macroeconomic policy 
that gave priority to stability. 
Traditional and non-traditional export earnings 
grew rapidly during 2002-2006 (30% per year in current 
dollars) and 12 % at constant prices). The ratio of exports 
to gross domestic product (exports/GDP) at current 
prices rose from 14% in 2002 to 28% in 2006. All of 
this also generated a surge in tax revenues, which made 
it possible to expand public expenditure and reduce the 
fiscal deficit to a very small amount.
As a result, GDP growth accelerated from 3.9% in 
2003 to 6.4% in 2005, 8.0% in 2006 and an estimated 
8.9% for 2007. During the same period, total productivity 
1 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, of the United 
States.
recovered to grow at 2.5 - 3% per year for the first time 
since a brief interregnum in 1993-1996. Gross fixed 
investment tracked GDP growth, albeit with a lag, thus 
helping to create new jobs. In particular, the rate of 
growth of employment in urban establishments with 
10 or more employees, accelerated from 3.0 percent in 
2003 to 5.7 % in 2005, with figures above 8 percent per 
year estimated for 2006 and 2007.
One of the surprising features of the current 
Peruvian boom is that the way it is perceived by one 
part of the population seems to differ from the view 
held by economists. In 2003-2006, a large proportion 
of the population did not consider they had benefited 
from the economic success. In the 2006 presidential 
elections 47% of the electorate voted to abandon the 
successful economic model and return to old populist 
practices, including development of the domestic market 
and nationalizations.
Several factors converge to explain this mismatch 
between economic success and its perception by a very 
large fraction of the population. These include highly 
unequal access to opportunities at the outset; the lag with 
which economic growth affects employment and incomes; 
the concentration of exports in a relatively small number 
of firms; and the technological backwardness of the 
vast peasant economy in the Andean sierra region. This 
article aims to explore just one of those factors, namely 
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the high degree of productive heterogeneity existing at 
the outset and its effects on the growth of employment, 
income and welfare among the population.
Peru has one of Latin America’s most productively 
heterogeneous economies. This is a feature of nearly all 
of its markets and productive sectors. In a given activity, 
alongside a large modern enterprise endowed with state-
of-the-art technology, cutting-edge business management, 
highly qualified and experienced staff  and a dynamic 
export market, there are also numerous microenterprises or 
small businesses that are extremely backward, displaying 
rudimentary technology, weak management capacity, 
inexperienced and unskilled workers, and a precarious 
positioning in local markets. 
Heterogeneity causes segmentation in product 
and factor markets. These do not adjust like their 
homogeneous counterparts, but the various segments 
adjust in different ways and at different speeds. If 
the Central Reserve Bank lowers the benchmark 
interest rate by half a point, credit becomes cheaper 
for organized and formal private enterprises, and this 
probably helps to increase their demand for credit. But 
the interest-rate cut does not produce the same effect 
among microenterprises, for which credit will remain 
rationed and very expensive.
The above is particularly true for a segmented 
labour market like that prevailing in Peru, in which the 
dynamism of modern sectors and the corresponding labour-
market segments is not automatically and proportionally 
transmitted to those that are less structured. Segmentation 
does not mean that there are sealed compartments 
within the labour market, but obstacles, shortcomings 
and barriers that intermediate the effect that changes 
occurring in certain segments has on others.
III
growth of employment and labour  
income by establishment size
1.  trends in 2002-2006
The first column of table 1 summarizes employment 
growth by labour-market segment in 2002-2006. As the 
table shows, employment grew very little in medium-sized 
enterprises (50 to 199 employees) and large firms (200 
employees or more); in contrast, it grew at a rate of 6.4% 
per year in small businesses (10 to 49 employees) and by 
5.0% per year in microenterprises (2 to 9 employees), 
according to data from the National Household Survey 
(fourth quarters, 2002-2006). The National Survey of 
Wages and Salaries, covering establishments with 10 
or more employees, produces a more optimistic result: 
aggregate employment among small, medium-sized 
and large firms grew at 5.3% per year during the same 
period, accelerating to 5.7% in 2005 and 8.9% in 2006. 
The (national) open unemployment rate fell from 6.0% 
in 2002 to 4.5% in 2006.
With such strong job growth in formal segments of 
the labour market, how could the population at large not 
have perceived an intensive improvement in welfare? The 
answer can be found in the second column of table 1.
In 2006, despite the very rapid expansion of formal 
employment, 53.4% of all jobs were in microenterprises, 
and 16.2% corresponded to unskilled self-employment, 
thus in total encompassing almost 70% of jobs in the 
country. A large fraction of these two categories usually 
forms part of what many analysts refer to as “informal 
employment”. The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) measures informal urban employment as the 
aggregate of persons working in microenterprises with 
up to five employees, together with unskilled self-
employed workers, unpaid family members, and persons 
in domestic service.
As a counterpart, after five years of rapid growth, 
employment in small, medium-sized and large enterprises 
accounted for just 17.2% of the country’s total employment 
in 2006. Consequently, despite significant growth of 
quality jobs in these categories, their contribution to 
total employment growth, and thus to aggregate welfare, 
was relatively small. 
Moreover, in 2002-2006, the proportion of unskilled 
self-employed workers shrank —because of the faster 
growth of employment in establishments of all sizes— 
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from 19.5% to 17.1% of the total; but in absolute terms 
it was far from offsetting the predominant trend.
This dichotomy between jobs in microenterprises 
and unskilled self-employment on the one hand, and 
employment in small, medium-sized and large enterprises 
on the other, is important in explaining the differences in 
average labour income between those segments. Table 
2 presents data on monthly labour income in 2006, by 
segments, using two sources: the National Household 
Survey, fourth quarter, and the National Survey of Wages 
and Salaries in establishments employing 10 or more 
workers. As this table shows, average monthly labour 
income in microenterprises was roughly 561 soles, 
equivalent in 2006 to about US$ 174. In that year average 
labour income among the unskilled self-employed was 
even less than that of workers in microenterprises.2 It 
should be recalled that  the skilled self-employed category 
encompasses not only professionals and technicians, but 
also other similar workers; so the very low-skilled self-
employed, who in practice are usually informal —e.g. a 
plumber— also include those who have no skills. This 
helps to explain income trends between one category 
and the other. In the case of an unskilled self-employed 
worker in the rural sector, average monthly labour 
income Recorded in 2006 was 240 soles, equivalent to 
US$ 75. In contrast, as the same table shows, average 
monthly labour income in small, medium-sized and 
large enterprises doubled, tripled or even quadrupled that 
recorded in microenterprises, depending on the size of 
the establishment and the statistical source used.
The above is strengthened by another development 
that occurred in 2002-2006. Average monthly labour 
income grew slightly in medium-sized and large firms; 
it grew substantially in small firms, given the increase 
in the proportion of employees and because their wages 
rose at a rate of 7.8% per year in real terms; and it grew 
much more slowly in microenterprises: 2.4% per year 
in real terms. Given the very low level at the outset, this 
meant an increase of 77 soles in current prices over four 
years, equivalent to US$ 23 (i.e. US$ 6 per year). Monthly 
labour income decreased in the unskilled self-employed 
segment, in both real and nominal terms.
Thus, part of the explanation is that most employment 
in the country is in very low-productivity jobs, which 
have not seen a significant improvement in their very 
low incomes during the boom period. Employment in 
the higher income and productivity segment may grow 
rapidly; but, given its small initial weight, thus far it has 
had little effect on total well-being, which does not mean 
that it could not rise greatly over a longer term.
The dichotomy between microenterprises and 
small, medium-sized and large firms is also relevant 
because of a second feature of the Peruvian economy: a 
large percentage of wage-earners are either unregistered 
or have no legal employment contract; they receive 
less than the minimum wage and have no access to 
non-wage labour benefits. In 2006, over 55% of private-
sector wage-earners did not have a legal employment 
contract (MTPE/PEEL, 2007), and over 75% of those 
in microenterprises were also in that situation As the 
proportion of wage-earners without a contract is much 
2  Apart from possible sampling errors, a decisive factor explaining this 
trend is that growth in the demand for labour has been concentrated 
among skilled workers, while the demand for unskilled workers has 
declined.
TABLE 1






1.    Public sector 3.4 7.5
2.    Medium-sized and large  
enterprises (50 employees 
or more)
0.4 9.4
3.    Small enterprises (10-49) 6.4 7.8
4.    Microenterprises (2-9) 5.3 53.4
    - 6 to 9 employees 10.4 15.7
    - 2 to 5 employees 4.2 37.7
5.    Skilled self-employedb –0.4 0.9
6.    Unskilled self-employed 1.1 17.1
    Urban 1.9 12.8
    Rural –0.8 4.3
7.    Domestic service 5.4 3.8
8.    Total employment 3.8 100
9.    Unemployed -2.1 4.5
10.  Employment rate –  95.5
11.  Total economically active  
population (EAP)
3.4 100
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics, National 
Household Survey (fourth quarters, 2002 and 2006). Labour Statis-
tics and Studies Programme (PEEL) of the Ministry of  Labour and 
Employment Promotion.
a Figures for 2006 are preliminary. Unpaid family workers are recor-
ded in the category of enterprise in which they were working. The 
skilled and unskilled self-employed categories exclude unpaid family 
workers. Self-employed persons with unpaid family workers are 
included in the microenterprise or small firm segment, depending 
on the number of family workers.
b  The skilled self-employed include professionals, technicians and 
the like. 
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higher among microenterprises, the latter’s persistently 
large share of total employment would also account 
for much of the difference in labour incomes between 
wage earners in small, medium-sized and large firms, 
and those of microenterprises.
2. the problem in the rural sector
The 2002-2006 upswing started in the coastal regions 
of the country and was fuelled by an export expansion. 
While the economy of Metropolitan Lima began to 
grow later, this did not happen at all in the sierra or 
Amazon regions. It should be remembered that the 
rural sector still accounts for just over one third of the 
total EAP, and that a very high proportion of it is in the 
sierra region, where very low-productivity minifundios 
predominate. This type of “peasant microenterprise” 
in the sierra region has even less access to resources 
and faces greater obstacles than its urban counterparts. 
Accordingly, its productivity levels are extremely low; 
and it generally lacks infrastructure and access to markets 
and credit. The very small size of farms makes it hard 
to introduce innovations, except through associations 
of small-scale producers. Social and cultural patterns 
pose an additional constraint.
Table 3 sets out a number of indicators that put the 
scale of the problem in perspective. The rural sector still 
accounts for 34.5% of the country’s total employment, 
which is higher than the EAP employed in Lima; but in 
rural zones wage-earners account for: (i) just 20.7% of 
total employment, compared to 50% in urban areas; (ii) 
52% of self-employed workers, compared to 40% in urban 
areas; (iii) 25.5% of unpaid family workers, compared 
to 6.3% in urban areas; and (iv) average labour income 
equivalent to 23% of that recorded in Metropolitan Lima. 
As the figures shown in the table for the rural sector 
are averages, the situation in the rural sierra region is 
even more problematic than they indicate. Using data 
from the National Household Survey 2001-2004, the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (2006) has 
estimated that 80% of economically active persons in 
the sierra region earn less than half of what is needed 
to buy the basic consumption basket, compared to 48% 
on the coast and 41% in Metropolitan Lima. All of this 
suggests a problem of very low productivity in the rural 
sector, particularly in the sierra region.
The current Government has initiated the Sierra 
Exportadora programme aimed at diversifying supply 
and attaining competitive quality and volume levels. To 
that end it is promoting a number of projects in which a 
private-sector investor enterprise coordinates with a large 
TABLE 2
Peru: monthly labour income, by segments, 2006 a b
 (Soles at 2006 prices)
National Household Survey
National Survey of Wages and  
Salaries in establishments with 10  
or more employees
1.    Large firms (200 or more ) 1 603.5 2 501.1
2. Medium firms (50 to 199) 1 270.7 1 940.2
3. Small firms (10 to 49) 792.4 2 323.7 c
4. Microenterprises (2 to 9) 561.4
 2 to 4 employees 528.2
 5 to 9 employees 742.7
5. Unskilled self-employed d 38.6
 Urban 437.8
 Rural 239.3
6. Skilled self-employed 973.5
7. Domestic service 523.3
8. Public sector 1 257.6
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics, National Household Survey, fourth quarter of 2006; and Survey of Wages and Salaries 
in establishments with 10 or more employees (June 2006). Labour Statistics and Studies Programme of the Ministry of Labour and Employment 
Promotion (PEEL/MTPE).
a Preliminary figures.
b Average monthly income excludes unpaid workers.
c Average labour income in this segment is high because of the larger number of employees in establishments with up to 49 workers, especially 
in commerce and services.
d Includes the income of professionals, technicians and the like.
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number of small-scale producers, transfers knowledge 
and inputs to them, and markets their output. While this 
programme is clearly a notable step forward, whether 
it will bring about a large-scale change in a scenario 
dominated by minifundios with no competitive potential 
is an open question. In the long term, changes in the 
land market will probably be needed to establish the 
minimum area required to adopt innovations and raise 
productivity.
TABLE 3









1. Unemployment rate 7.6 8.5 7.0 1.0 5.4
2. Total employment 65.5 27.0 38.5 34.5 100
3. Wage-earning em-
ployment
49.9 56.6 45.1 20.7 39.7
4. Self-employed 40.2 35.2 43.8 52.3 44.4
5. Unpaid family 
workers
6.3 3.5 8.3 25.5 13.0
6. Labour incomea 788 1 062 597 233 594
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, on the basis of 
the National Household Survey 2001-2004.
a In soles at 2004 prices.
IV
Microenterprise policy
Heterogeneity is clearly evident in nearly all domestic 
markets, since 97% of the country’s firms are 
microenterprises, 2.8% are small businesses, and 
just 0.2% are medium-sized and large firms (MTPE/
PEEL, 2007). This is reflected in glaring differences 
among productivity and labour incomes, depending 
on establishment size.
This is only one manifestation of the problem, 
however. What really explains such differences is 
the very unequal access to resources. While small, 
medium-sized and large firms have access to credit, 
are managed by a highly skilled personnel, work 
with trained labour, invest in fixed capital, human 
capital and innovations, possess information and are 
well placed in domestic and international markets, 
the opposite is true for most microenterprises. Their 
access to credit is limited and very expensive; only 
0.1% of microenterprises export their products; their 
productivity and profitability does not allow them to 
pay for labour or management training; they lack the 
resources, capital and information needed to introduce 
innovations and invest; their market identification and 
participation are usually very weak, and they often have 
highly precarious links to local markets. 
All of this also results in a very high rate of 
enterprise mortality —much higher than in medium-
sized and large firms. Up to 80% of microenterprises 
close down before their third anniversary (Matthews, 
2007); and 43% of those that export fail to last longer 
than two years (ADEX, various years). This implies 
a much higher risk rate among microenterprises, and 
commercial banks perceive this. 
The very high microenterprise mortality rate is more 
than offset by new business start-ups. Given the rates 
at which these enterprises come and go, the apparent 
stability of statistical averages in terms of stock variables 
conceals significant movements in flow variables. For 
that reason, inflows and outflows of personnel in this 
segment are significant.
This has direct repercussions on the type of job 
and level of labour incomes that microenterprises can 
generate: very low productivity, low pay, and instability. 
This has an adverse effect on the population’s welfare, 
given the high proportion of total employment provided 
by microenterprises: 53% in 2006.
Even assuming very strong future employment 
growth in small, medium-sized and large firms (e.g. a 
sustained annual rate of 8%, compared to the 5.9% per 
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year recorded in 2002-2006),3 together with expected 
EAP growth of 2.4% a year,4 it would take 14 years to 
double the share of employment in small, medium-sized 
and large firms, from the 17.2% recorded in 2006 to a 
level of 34.9% by 2020. If the empirical reference used 
is the National Household Survey (fourth quarters), the 
argument would be strengthened further. Under that 
scenario, the proportion of employment corresponding 
to microenterprises would decline somewhat, but the 
productivity and income gap between that segment and 
the others would continue to widen. This simple example 
suggests that in addition to seeking high employment 
growth in small, medium-sized and large firms, it is 
essential to formulate and apply productive policies to 
speed up the increase in microenterprise productivity 
and competitiveness. 
It also seems highly unlikely that the boom in 
the Peruvian economy, which is highly sensitive to 
developments on external markets, will last for another 14 
years; and this makes it all the more urgent to implement 
public policies in favour of microenterprises.
Despite the major importance of microenterprises 
for employment in the country, public and private policies 
targeting this segment in Peru are few, disperse and 
weak. Colombia, whose economy is 1.5 times as large, 
spends 12 times as much on supporting microenterprises: 
roughly US$ 4 billion compared to US$ 340 million 
in Peru. Similarly, in 2006, the entity responsible for 
microenterprise programmes —the Small Business 
and Microenterprise Promotion Centre (PROMPYME) 
integrated into the Ministry of Labour and Employment 
Promotion in 2007 under the name Mi Empresa— had 
an annual budget of US$ 1.9 million to support the 
competitive development of this type of firm, compared 
to the US$ 350 million destined for similar programmes 
by the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support 
Service (SEBRAE), or the US$ 50 million spent by 
the Production Development Corporation (CORFO) 
in Chile.  
This article does not set out to evaluate all financial 
service and business development policies targeting 
microenterprises and small businesses in force in Peru. 
Only the following will be analysed: (i) the target 
group; (ii) informal activity; (iii) access to credit; (iv) 
access to labour and management training; (v) access 
to innovations; (vi) taxation; (vii) labour standards; and 
(viii) productive clusters and outsourcing.
3 According to the National Survey of Wages and Salaries in establish-
ments with 10 or more employees.
4 According to the Population Division (CELADE), 2007.
1.  target group
The microenterprise segment is highly varied, encompassing 
units with competitive potential along with enterprises 
that produce for subsistence. In 2006 some 700,000 
of the 2,100,000 microenterprises in existence were 
estimated to have competitive potential (García, 2007). 
Policies to promote and enhance competitiveness should 
target those firms if the aim is to prevent policies for 
this sector from serving merely as oxygen providing 
temporary assistance.
2.  Informal activity
A critical issue in this context is economic activity 
performed on an unregistered basis (informality), which 
implies widespread evasion of regulations, i.e. the 
underground economy. Roughly 650,000 microenterprises 
and small businesses are registered with the Office of 
the National Superintendent of Taxation (SUNAT); but 
as the total is over 2.3 million, this means that 70% of 
these firms are “informal” vis-à-vis the tax authority. A 
similar situation is found in labour, employment, health 
insurance and local authority records. This raises a key 
issue: what policies would be needed to “formalize” a 
large proportion of the firms that are evading all current 
regulations. The answer is clear: microenterprises will only 
formalize when the advantages of doing so outweigh the 
disadvantages; and this points to the need to complement 
current policies with a well-designed set of measures 
targeting microenterprises and small business.. This 
article proposes a quid pro quo, namely give access to 
all the policies suggested in the following sections only 
to those microenterprises that “formalize”.
An essential step is to reduce the cost, time and 
complexity of the procedures required to set up or 
register a business. Progress has been made on this at 
the national level, although the procedures and their cost 
could be simplified still further. Obstacles remain at the 
local level, despite various local authorities having now 
agreed to simplify procedures and reduce the time and 
cost involved.
3.  Access to credit 
Microenterprises face two constraints in credit markets 
The first is access: their credit is rationed, because the 
supply of credit to microenterprises is much smaller than 
the demand for it.  The second constraint, linked to the 
first, is the cost of credit, which is usually between five 
and seven times higher than that paid by medium-sized 
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and large firms. According to the Superintendency of 
Banking, Insurance and AFPs (SBS), in late 2006 interest 
rates on loans to microenterprises averaged between 38% 
and 53%, depending on the type of loan and the financial 
institution in question. These figures were several times 
higher than the 8.2% rate on discounts for commercial 
loans offered by banks to larger firms at the same date. 
This situation has meant an increase in production costs 
among microenterprises, a reduction in their competitive 
capacity, and far fewer possibilities for investing in 
technology, equipment and human capital.
As a result, microenterprises are forced to lock up 
a larger proportion of their working capital in stocks of 
inputs, merchandise, or pending invoices. By holding a 
larger proportion of their capital in the form of current 
assets, they have much less capital available to acquire 
fixed assets (equipment) or innovations, or to invest in 
human capital. Consequently, the restricted access to 
credit for microenterprises and SMEs directly undermines 
factors that otherwise would have enabled them to raise 
their productivity.
In late 2006, financial credit to microenterprises 
was based on a system comprising 10 commercial banks, 
13 municipal savings banks (CMS), 12 rural saving and 
loan associations (CRAC) and 13 microenterprise and 
small business development entities (EDPYMES). Of 
the 10 commercial banks that engaged in microfinance 
activities, three of them accounted for 80% of all loans: 
Banco de Crédito, Banco del Trabajo and Mi Banco. 
According to  SBS records, the outstanding balance 
of direct credits extended by microfinance institutions 
in December 2006 amounted to 4.935 billion soles, of 
which 2.678 billion were direct loans to microenterprises 
(636,000 borrowers). This figure represented 3.5% of 
total credit extended by the financial system to the private 
sector, thus giving a clear idea of the asymmetry that 
exists in access to credit in Peru. 
Suggestions for improving the credit situation 
include the following: (i) use of new lending technology, 
already trialled in agriculture by the Development 
Finance Corporation (COFIDE)5 to promote loans 
to microenterprise groups; (ii) strengthening of the 
microfinance system; and (iii) establishment of guarantee 
and risk funds to promote the growth of microenterprises 
that have competitive potential. Expansion and updating 
of microenterprise records also provides much needed 
and useful information for entities operating in the 
microfinance sector.
5  COFIDE is a second-tier bank.
4.  Access to labour and management training
The low productivity of microenterprises does not allow 
them to spend on labour and management training in the 
same way as larger firms. The available data show that 
average expenditure on labour training by microenterprises 
is 1/10 of the national average and 1/20 of the amount 
spent on training by medium-sized and large firms 
(García, 2005). Whereas 50% of medium-sized and 
large firms provide training for their employees, the 
corresponding figure is 18% in small firms and just 
9.1% in microenterprises (Chacaltana, 2004). In the 
case of business management training, only 26% of 
microentrepreneurs have completed secondary education, 
which makes such training even more necessary for this 
segment. Nonetheless, only 7% of microenterprises 
have access to assistance services in this field, most of 
which deal with accounting and taxation issues rather 
than business management as such. At the present 
time, a cost-sharing system operates through vouchers 
(Bonopymes) issued to the microentrepreneur: the latter 
receives three training vouchers with discounts of up to 49 
soles each, and another for assistance services with a 70% 
discount up to a limit of 600 soles. Nonetheless, the total 
number of vouchers issued is just a few thousand, so the 
maximum amount transferred is US$ 200,000 per year, 
in circumstances where potential demand would come 
from 700,000 firms and amount to millions of dollars. The 
assistance offered by private firms that provide services 
and operate in this domain also does not respond to the 
effective demands of microenterprises, e.g. on the topics 
of management and productivity growth.
The suggestion is therefore to set up a fund to finance 
labour and management training among microenterprises 
and SMEs, together with an incentive in the form of a 
tax credit with an annual upper limit of 1.5% of the 
payroll. At the same time, it would be feasible to design 
and finance short training courses for staff in consulting 
firms operating with microenterprises and SMEs, focused 
on marketing and management in terms of productivity 
and quality for microenterprises.
5.  Access to innovations
Sustained productivity growth depends on the firm’s 
capacity to incorporate product and process innovations. 
When initial productivity levels are very low, relatively 
simple changes in products and processes make a major 
contribution. A recent example in Peru is the adoption of 
new simple crop-growing and irrigation techniques, which 
significantly raised yields and productivity in the country’s 
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incipient export agriculture. Nonetheless,  if innovations 
are to be incorporated, several factors are needed, such 
as incentives,6 a minimum capacity for identifying 
technologies available worldwide, and resources to 
finance their incorporation. The microenterprise segment 
lacks all three. Although the State has made an effort 
—through Technological Innovation Centres (CITEs) 
sponsored by the Ministry of Production— in practice 
it is hard to replace hundreds of thousands of private 
initiatives in this domain. 
The voucher system mentioned above does not 
substantially cover the microenterprise sector, nor induce 
a significant change in favour of innovation among them. 
The alternative is to introduce cost-sharing vouchers 
for the purchase of innovations, together with technical 
assistance to incorporate them. Collective bonds can 
also be established for groups of microenterprises, 
and innovation vouchers can be combined with those 
corresponding to labour and management training.
6.  Labour standards
In 2005, average (legal) labour costs per hour worked 
were US$ 2.60 (García, 2007). This consisted of wage 
costs of US$ 1.62 per hour —among the lowest in Latin 
America— and a non-wage labour cost of 61%, which 
was among the region’s highest. Nonetheless, this average 
is not very representative of what really happens at the 
establishment level. In large firms, the standard labour 
cost per hour in 2005 was US$ 4.95, in medium-sized 
firms it was US$ 3.23, in small firms US$ 2.81, and in 
microenterprises US$ 1.29. The differences are therefore 
considerable; but they are even greater when the labour 
cost actually paid is considered rather than the legal norm, 
because microenterprises do not pay the minimum wage 
nor do they provide the benefits included in non-wage 
labour costs. In this case, the effective labour cost per 
hour in microenterprises drops to US$ 0.80 per hour.
An initial issue is that in the bulk of microenterprises 
and for most employed people in the country, the legal 
benefits included in non-wage labour costs (vacations, 
health insurance, pensions, gratifications or bonuses, 
family allowances, length of service contribution to 
fund periods of unemployment, legal working week, 
compensation for dismissal and legal share of profits) 
are in practice irrelevant, because they are evaded. The 
6  The higher yield obtained from adopting an innovation tends to 
dissipate as other competitors follow. Consequently, an incentive is 
needed to equalize private and social profitability to allow innovations 
to spread massively.
same is true for the legal minimum wage, which in 2006 
amounted to 500 soles per month. The National Household 
Survey for the fourth quarter of 2006 showed that 60% 
of workers in microenterprises received a labour income 
below this amount. Moreover, as many of those earning 
above the minimum wage did so by working more than 
eight hours per day and on public holidays, it is easy to 
infer that for a very large proportion of microenterprises, 
the minimum wage is not applied and is evaded.
When 80% of establishments fulfil the regulations 
and 20% do not, one can talk of evasion and take steps 
to improve supervision and oversight systems. But 
when only 3% of establishments representing 17% 
of employment comply with labour regulations, and 
the bulk of the remaining 97% do not, it is essential to 
reconsider the issue and ask whether the microenterprise 
segment has a level of productivity that enables it to 
fulfil current labour standards. The regulations need to 
adapt to reality and not pretend otherwise. Once again, 
the strong productive heterogeneity that characterizes 
the country suggests that it is not feasible to apply the 
same labour standards to the microenterprise segment 
as to larger and more productive firms. It is also not 
feasible to apply the same minimum wage. A single 
minimum wage of 500 soles may be very high for the 
productivity of many microenterprises, but very low for 
the productivity of all medium-sized and large firms.
In fact, this was recognized in 2003 in Law 28.015, 
which significantly reduced the non-wage labour cost 
for microenterprises. Nonetheless, between 2003 and 
late 2007, only 40,000 microenterprises registered and 
became formalized under this new regime. Accepting 
that a large proportion of registered microenterprises 
have already succumbed due to the high mortality rate 
in their segment, today some 25,000 microenterprises 
would probably remain in the register, out of a total of 2.1 
million, operating under the new special labour regime. 
This shows that it is not easy to persuade microenterprises 
to register under the new scheme, without implementing 
a set of complementary measures giving access to 
resources benefiting them. In other words, for a special 
labour regime to have the desired effects, it needs to 
be accompanied by complementary measures in other 
policy areas that allow for access to resources and raise 
productivity. The reason is very simple: like any other 
type of firm, microenterprises need profitability, demand 
for their products and access to resources to raise their 
productivity. Potential profitability can be provided by 
a special legal regime and/or implicit subsidies in other 
policies. But unless access to resources is improved, 
a sustained increase in the productivity and output of 
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potentially competitive microenterprises, and hence 
their real profitability, will remain unlikely. Special 
labour standards for this segment will be adopted by a 
larger number of microenterprises if at the same time 
complementary policies are formulated and applied that 
expand their access to resources.
This raises a crucial issue. As is well known, the 
labour-cost measure that is relevant for competitiveness 
is labour cost per unit produced, expressed in foreign 
currency, and not labour cost per hour. Labour cost per 
unit produced is defined as the ratio between labour 
cost per hour and hourly productivity, corrected by the 
exchange rate to express it in foreign currency. From 
this standpoint, microenterprises may have a low hourly 
labour cost and yet remain much less competitive than 
large firms if their productivity is very weak. An example 
can clarify this point. A large firm with a labour cost of 
US$ 5 per hour and productivity of US$ 12 per hour has 
a labour cost per unit produced of US$ 0.42 per hour 
(5/12). A microenterprise with a labour cost of US$ 
1.29 per hour and productivity of US$ 2.1 per hour, has 
a labour cost per unit produced of US$ 0.61 per hour 
(1.29/2.1). Consequently, to be able to compete, it has to 
ignore labour standards and reduce its effective labour 
cost to US$ 0.86 per hour, so that, with a productivity 
of US$ 2.1 per hour, it operates with a labour cost per 
unit produced of US$ 0.41 per hour, which is slightly 
less than that of the large firm.7 This example shows 
very clearly the importance of access to resources in 
raising productivity levels among microenterprises and 
making them more competitive.
7.  taxation
One of the reasons preventing a much larger number of 
microenterprises from registering in the special labour 
regime created in 2003 was the taxation cost they faced 
upon registration. If the non-wage labour cost is lowered 
from 61% to 30%, the total labour cost of microenterprises 
will be reduced by roughly 19%. Assuming that total 
labour costs represent 35% of total costs, the benefit 
provided by the special regime is equivalent to 0.19 
x 0.35, i.e. less than 7% of total initial costs. But on 
registration, the microenterprise has to start paying 
taxes. The general sales tax rate is 19%. Income tax, 
depending on the profit level and the size of the firm, 
will fluctuate between 5% and 14% of profits, depending 
7 The exchange rate in 2006 was 3.15 soles per dollar, and this that 
can be used to translate the example into soles.
on the special regime applied (RUS or RER),8 which is 
equivalent to approximately 1.7%-5% of sales. In short, 
when a microenterprise registers, taxation will raise its 
total cost by between 21% and 24%, in return for which 
it will obtain a benefit of less than 7%. Even correcting 
expected costs and benefits for a likelihood of detection 
of 33% (assuming a normal statistical distribution) in 
the event of continuing to evade, it is not worthwhile 
for the microenterprise to register in the special labour 
regime, because the benefit provided by it is less than 
or equal to the costs incurred by doing so. If one adds in 
the backdated tax debt that the microenterprise could be 
charged if it is found to have been operating for several 
years, it is unsurprising that so few microenterprises 
have registered in the special labour regime.
Tax laws currently provide a special regime for 
small productive units, consisting of a simplification 
of collateral requirements —records and account 
books— and the way in which income tax is calculated 
(RER and RUS). But the situation in reality suggests 
that it will be essential to provide a more attractive 
treatment, at least for a certain period of time, if the 
aim is to persuade the 700,000 or 800,000 potentially 
competitive microenterprises to register for tax purposes 
as part of their formalization process.
It therefore seems essential to establish a tax incentive 
or credit encouraging firms to formalize, with the aim of 
persuading microenterprises to register for tax purposes. 
The Office of the National Superintendent of Taxation 
(SUNAT) would not lose through this, because today it 
is not receiving taxes from microenterprises that evade 
the regulations.
8.  Clusters and outsourcing
In practice it is hard for a microenterprise, using its own 
individual resources, to finance labour and management 
training, innovations, organizational improvements for 
competitiveness, market surveys, and similar matters. 
It is also very difficult to implement a selective policy 
in favour of potentially competitive microenterprises 
on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, both from 
the microenterprise standpoint and for reasons of 
public policy access, a crucial issue is to promote de 
facto  partnership, i.e. to promote initiatives among 
microentrepreneurs to form clusters based on the 
practical needs of their firms. This would make it 
possible, for example, to set up technical assistance 
8  RUS: Single simplified regime; RER: Special income tax regime
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services, labour and management training for a group 
of microenterprises, which would be much more viable 
and less costly than providing the same services case 
by case. The same is applicable to credit using cross-
collateralization systems.
A similar scheme could be proposed for entry 
into more demanding markets, outsourcing, input 
supply for export chains, government procurement or 
even export consortia. To improve chances of success, 
microenterprises can set up clusters enabling them to 
exploit the consequent economies of scale.
One way to promote partnership is to allow groups, 
consortia, associations or clusters of microenterprises 
that join, either on a de facto or legal basis, preferential 




Over half of the active population, employed in very 
low-productivity and low-pay segments (urban and rural 
microenterprises and unskilled self-employed workers) 
did not enjoy any significant income growth in 2002-
2006, even though they could see how the rest of the 
population was benefiting from the economic boom. 
This fact, evidenced in this analysis by the behaviour 
of labour markets in that period, is one of the factors 
explaining why in 2006 a large proportion of Peruvian 
voters were willing to abandon a successful economic 
growth model.
The Peruvian economy is essentially heterogeneous 
because of major differences in access to resources, 
which generates segmented product and factor markets. 
Segmented labour markets in practice operate very 
differently from what is assumed by economic theory 
developed for homogeneous markets. In such markets 
there are numerous obstacles, deficiencies and barriers that 
intermediate interactions between their various segments. 
In that setting, the rapid expansion of modern segments 
and employment and wages in small, medium-sized and 
large formal enterprises does not spread quickly and 
fully to urban and rural segments of microenterprises 
and unskilled self-employed workers, because: (i) rates 
of employment absorption in these segments remain 
high, which slows growth in their labour income; and 
(ii) microenterprises face shortcomings and access 
barriers in terms of the resources they need to grow 
competitively.
One of the features of segmented markets is that 
the process of adjustment in each of the segments, and 
its speed, differ from one to another. A given policy 
measure has different effects that make themselves felt 
at different speeds in each segment. 
Economic policy is generally targeted on a country’s 
modern and structured segments. This is appropriate, 
for otherwise the country would not develop. But, 
what happens in situations such as that prevailing in 
Peru, where the degree of heterogeneity and market 
segmentation is extremely high? What happens when 
70% of the population depends on events occurring in 
unstructured markets? What happens when employment 
in small, medium-sized and large firms only accounts 
for 17% of total employment, and 53% of the latter is 
in urban and rural microenterprises? Is it sufficient to 
promote growth in the highest productivity and income 
segment? Is it sufficient, in this setting, to propose an 
economic policy for the more modern and structured 
segments, together with a social policy to combat poverty 
among those who depend on the functioning of the less 
structured segments? Events in Peru over the last 30 
years tend to confirm that it is not sufficient.
It is insufficient because of the very high proportion 
of unskilled self-employed jobs, and particularly those 
in microenterprises. Accordingly, policies to raise 
productivity should include potentially competitive 
microenterprises and promote greater access to the 
resources they need. From this perspective, it is 
essential to establish, among other policies, a special 
labour regime for microenterprises (labour standards 
and minimum wage) and a special transitory taxation 
regime; to more vigorously promote policies to improve 
microenterprise access to credit, markets, labour and 
management training, and innovation; and above all, 
to encourage the various forms of microenterprise 
clustering and size subcontracting. Such policies should 
target the roughly 700,000 potentially competitive 
microenterprises, and provide their benefits only to those 
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that agree to “formalize”. As noted above, institutional 
changes —in labour and tax regulations— complement 
policies that expand access to resources. Consequently, 
implementing the former without the latter does not have 
the same chance of success as implementing both types 
of measure simultaneously. 
Complementarity and interdependence between 
the policies listed is another reason for developing a 
set of policies in favour of microenterprises, rather 
than isolated actions. Thus, for example, without 
microenterprise management training or access to 
innovations, productivity growth will remain very 
slow; so the high microenterprise mortality rate will 
persist, impairing access to commercial credit. The 
most important thing, therefore, is to implement a set 
of policies that gradually but simultaneously eliminate 
the key constraints.
As a policy criterion, all of the measures set out 
above should focus on development of the respective 
markets —including those for training services, 
information and technical assistance, innovations and 
financial services— to gradually allow microenterprises 
with higher competitive potential a better chance of 
accessing each of those markets. In this way, government 
intervention may be much more successful than direct 
State provision of the services in question.
The real economic policy challenge facing 
Peru is to design public policy measures that have 
the desired effect on the specific market segments 
being targeted. This does not mean that different 
economic policies have to be designed for different 
segments.,. It is more a question of incorporating 
into economic policy a recognition that its effects 
will differ between one segment and another, so 
the measures adopted should be able to selectively 
influence the different segments in the desired 
direction —e.g. enhancing competitiveness. This 
is a departure from the traditional conception of 
economic policy for homogeneous markets and 
comes closer to the reality of Peru —a heterogeneous 
economy with segmented markets. In other words, 
it moves economic policymaking away from an 
idealized blackboard model, and forces it to take 
account of the real world. 
(Original: Spanish)
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